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Abstract We consider a model of polluting firms subject to tax on emissions,
monitoring, and penalties in case of underreporting and which face a choice between
a more expensive clean and a less expensive dirty technology. Moreover, emissions
are subject to random events. We show that the optimal monitoring is a cut-off policy,
where all reports below a threshold are inspected with the same probability, while
reports above the threshold are not monitored. If the adoption of the technology is
firms’ private information, too few firms will adopt the clean technology under the
optimal monitoring policy. However, when the environmental agency can check the
technology adopted by the firms, the optimal policy may induce overswitching or
underswitching to the clean technology.
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1 Introduction
Pollution prevention and clean technologies have come to the forefront in reducing
and controlling the environmental effects created by firms. Environmental Agencies
(EAs) face the important challenge of encouraging the adoption of such measures and
compelling compliance with environmental laws and regulations. For this aim, they
often design a deterrence policy based on inspections. This paper contributes to the
literature that analyzes the optimal inspection policy taking into account firms’ stra-
tegic behavior (see Cohen 1999, and Sandmo 2000, for two extensive reviews of the
literature). We build and analyze a model where firms choose a production technology
which, together with some random event, determines the final emission level. That is,
we explicitly take into account the random nature of pollution and its effects on the
optimal inspection policy.
We consider the coexistence of two alternative technologies: a clean technology and
a dirty technology. A “clean technology” is a manufacturing process or product tech-
nology that reduces pollution or waste energy use, or material use in comparison with
the “dirty technology”. That is, expected level of emissions when production is carried
out with the clean technology is lower than if the firm uses the dirty technology. For
both technologies, the realized emission level is random and it is privately observed
by the firm. Indeed, although firms can limit emissions of pollutants by deciding the
production technology, by adjusting the mix of outputs and inputs, and through the use
of abating technologies and management practices, this control is often not precise.
Many factors such as weather, equipment failures, and human error may cause realized
emissions to differ from intended emissions. Also, input relative price changes may
affect the level of polluting input used.
In our framework, the environmental regulation is based on taxes over reported
emissions, monitoring, and penalties over unreported emissions. Firms report their
emission level and pay the taxes associated to them. The true emission level can only
be observed (and made verifiable) by the EA after an inspection.
We consider situations where the EA wants to induce firms to make a major dis-
crete investment to help the environment. Firms face different costs to adopt the clean
technology, which usually cannot be observed by the EA. In this paper, we study
how to provide incentives for the adoption of the clean technology at the lowest costs
and which firms should be encouraged to do so. In particular, we analyze the optimal
monitoring strategy when the EA takes into account the random nature of pollution:
bad luck may cause a high level of emissions even when the firm adopts the clean
technology while good luck may diminish emission level of a firm that uses the dirty
technology.
Before analyzing the two main scenarios, for expositional purposes, we study an
instrumental framework where we assume that the EA faces a single firm and knows
the firm’s cost of adopting the technologies but the technology chosen is not verifi-
able. We show that the optimal inspection policy that induces a firm to adopt the clean
technology is a cut-off strategy where all the reports under the cut-off are inspected
with the same probability and reports over this cut-off are not audited.
In the first main scenario that we consider, the EA faces a population of firms that
differ in the cost of adopting the clean technology and where both the technology
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adopted by the firms and their costs are non-verifiable. The optimal monitoring is
the cut-off policy that would be designed for the “marginal” firm as if its emissions
distribution was an average between the clean and the dirty technology. Second, we
analyze situations where the technology adopted by each firm is observable, although
the cost encountered by the firm is not. In this case, only those firms producing with
the dirty technology will be inspected through the cut-off rule corresponding to the
“marginal” firm.
In all the scenarios, the policy calls for a monitoring policy that is extensive rather
than intensive: it is optimal to monitor with the same probability a large range of
reports. This makes the firm pay higher expected taxes when emissions are high,
which gives it stronger incentives to adopt the clean technology.
In all cases, firms with low adoption costs will be induced to switch to the clean
technology while high-cost firms will keep the dirty one. We compare the conditions
under which firms are pushed to adopt the clean technology with the case where the
EA has all the information (first-best). When the technology adopted is private infor-
mation for the firms, the optimal monitoring policy induces too few firms to choose
the clean technology as compared to the first best since giving the firm incentives
to adopt is costly. In contrast, when the cost is firms’ private information, while the
technology adopted is verifiable, the EA may want to push firms to adopt the clean
technology too often to save monitoring costs as firms with the clean technology will
not be monitored.
Several papers have considered that pollution emissions frequently produce sto-
chastic environmental damages.1 But they have studied different aspects from our
paper. Some authors have analyzed the advantages and disadvantages of introducing
self-reporting (whereas in our paper is assumed to be in place) on the emission level in
situations where emissions are random. In particular, Innes (1999) analyzes a model
where there are expost benefits of cleaning-up if an environmental accident (high
level of pollution) occurs. In his model, firms choose the level of care (that can be
interpreted as the choice of a technology), and this care affects the probability of an
accident. Innes shows that when there is no self-reporting a firm will engage in clean-
up only if audited, while the firm always cleans-up when self-reporting is in place.
Malik (1993) compares the case with and without self-reporting in a situation where
collecting penalties and taxes is costly and the monitoring technology is imperfect
(including both types I and II of errors). In this framework, self-reporting does not
necessarily reduce regulation costs because of costly sanctioning (see also Kaplow
and Shavell 1994; Livernois and McKenna 1999). Hamilton and Requate (2006) ana-
lyze the choice between emission caps and environmental quality standards when
emissions are random. They show that when firms invest in abatement equipment, an
emission standard induces over-investment relative to the socially optimal resource
allocation, while under-investment tends to occur under an ambient environmental
policy (Requate and Unold 2003; Bontems and Bourgeon 2005, study the incentives
1 For example, the damage from a given amount of effluent released in a river depends on features which
vary temporally, such as seasonal fluctuations in water volume, temperature and turbidity. The effect of
airborne emissions on air quality depends on prevailing atmospheric conditions, such as thermal structure,
circulation, pressure, and humidity.
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provided through different policy instruments in models where emissions are deter-
ministic).
The model analyzed in this paper also contrasts with most of the models that study
the optimal inspection policy, since they assume that the firm decides directly its
(non-random) emission level. For example, Harford (1978, 1987) analyzes the opti-
mal inspection frequency, considering that the solution is interior, and obtains that the
probability of monitoring influences the firm’s report but not its actual emissions. In
Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo (2006), we show that when emissions are determin-
istic (the firm fully controls them), the EA optimal strategy induces a corner solution,
in the sense that there are always firms that do not comply with the environmental
objective and others that do comply but all of them evade the environmental taxes.
In addition, in the papers considering deterministic emissions the optimal inspection
policy does not depend on the report. In contrast, in this paper where emissions depend
on the decision of the firm and some random events, first, firm’s reported emissions
varies from firm to firm as a function of the true emission level, and second, the opti-
mal monitoring does depend on the firm’s report and is tougher for low reports. This
contingent policy allows to give the firm the right incentives to choose the clean tech-
nology, as low emissions appear less often than when the dirty technology is adopted.
Concerning the optimality of the use of environmental taxes, Macho-Stadler (2008)
shows that, when the compliance issue is taken into account, it is less costly to achieve
any level of compliance through taxes than using standards or tradable permits.
In terms of methodology, analyzing the audit policy to induce compliance with the
environmental policy is close to the literature on optimal auditing in tax evasion (some
related papers are Reinganum and Wilde 1985; Scotchmer 1986; Sánchez and Sobel
1993; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 1997). However, in this literature the tax-
payer is assumed to have no choice other than reporting an income level. In contrast,
the problem addressed in the present paper is more complex and has not been consid-
ered before. In our model, the agent decides first on the technology of production and
second on the report about emissions once the (random) emission level is realized.
Therefore, our model combines two informational dimensions: a moral hazard prob-
lem with respect to the choice of the production technology and an adverse selection
problem concerning the report of emissions.
Some previous papers have analyzed how the regulatory regime via emissions taxes
or standards may affect firms’ adoption of emissions abatement technology (see, for
example, Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince 1989; Gersbach and Requate
2004; Tarui and Polasky 2005). Our paper is complementary to these contributions
as we show how the monitoring policy, in environments where emissions cannot be
identified without inspection, can be designed to optimize firms’ adoption at the lowest
cost. Finally, in a context with environmental standards, Arguedas (2005) analyzes the
eventual adoption by a firm of a cleaner technology in exchange for reductions of the
fines for non-compliance.
The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2, we introduce the model and analyze
a firm’s report given its technology and the inspection policy. Section 3 introduces
the scenario with two different technologies. In Sect. 4, we analyze the instrumental
framework where there is a single firm and both the firm and the EA know the cost of
adopting the clean technology. We characterize the policy that the EA puts in place if
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it wants to induce this firm to adopt the clean technology. Sections 5 and 6 constitute
the central part of the paper. We characterize the optimal monitoring policy for the
EA that faces a set of firms when their adoption cost is not observable assuming either
that the technology adopted is non verifiable (Sect. 5), or that it is verifiable (Sect. 6).
In Sect. 7, we conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix.
2 The Firm’s report under emission taxes
We model situations where a firm’s emissions are random, but the likelihood of high
or low level of emissions depends upon the firm’s choice of technology. A firm’s level
of emissions (or damages) e is distributed in the interval [e, e] according to the dis-
tribution function F(e; E), where E denotes the production technology chosen by
the firm. We assume that F(·; E) is continuously differentiable and that f (e; E) =
∂ F(e; E)/∂e > 0 on [e, e]. The cost of the technology E is sunk.
We assume that emissions are taxed according to a linear schedule, with marginal
tax rate t . However, emission levels are private information of the firm and they can
only be assessed if the firm is monitored by the EA. The firm is asked to send a report
z ∈ [e, e] on its emissions, once they are realized. It may choose a report z that does
not coincide with the true emission level e.
The EA monitors the firm to control its emissions. We denote by α(z) the probability
that the EA will audit the emissions of the firm when it reports a level of emissions z.
The strategy α(·) followed by the EA is decided previous to the choice of the technol-
ogy E , that is, we assume that the EA is able to commit to its monitoring strategy. The
EA’s monitoring cost is linear in the number of audits and, without loss of generality,
we normalize the cost of monitoring one firm to 1. If the firm is monitored and its level
of emissions is found to be higher than its report, then a penalty is imposed to the firm.
If the firm overreports its pollution and it is monitored, then it gets the excess tax paid
back and there is no bonus for overreporting. For simplicity, we assume that the penalty
is linear in the underreported emissions. We also assume that the marginal penalty rate,
denoted θ , is exogenous. Parameter θ includes the taxes due to the EA, hence θ > t .
The firm’s expected costs when the emissions are e, the report is z and the moni-
toring strategy is α(·) are:
t z + α(z)θ [e − z] if z ≤ e,
t z + α(z)t[e − z] if z > e.
The timing of the decisions is as follows. First, the EA decides on the monitoring
strategy α(·). Second, the firm chooses the technology E at a certain cost. Emissions
are realized according to the density function f (e; E). Third, after having observed
the realized emissions e, the firm decides on the report z and pays the taxes t z. The
firm is monitored with probability α(z). If it is audited and it has underreported, then
the firm pays the penalty θ [e − z] (if it has overreported, then it gets t[e − z] back).
The firm chooses z to minimize its costs, as a function of the realized emissions e.
That is, at the last stage, the firm chooses z(e). We denote c(e;α(·)) firm’s expected
costs when its emission level is e and it makes the report that minimizes its costs.
123
282 SERIEs (2010) 1:277–304
We now study firm’s behavior concerning its report z and firm’s expected cost given
its technology E and the inspection policy α(·). The analysis in this section is closely
related to the one developed by Scotchmer (1986) and Sánchez and Sobel (1993).
Lemma 1 A firm whose emission level is e:
(i) never reports more than its emissions: z ≤ e;
(ii) never reports z < e if α(z) > t/θ;
(iii) reports honestly, i.e., z = e, only if α(z) ≥ t/θ for all z ∈ [e, e).
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is the following. Given the tax rate t and the penalty
rate θ , a monitoring probability of t/θ is enough to spur honest behavior. Therefore,
a firm never submits a report z lower than its real emission e if reporting z leads to
inspection with a probability higher than t/θ . On the other hand, the firm will not
report honestly if it can submit a report z < e that is monitored with a probability
lower than t/θ .
According to Lemma 1, the EA will not have incentives to inspect any report with
a probability higher than t/θ , since monitoring is costly. Therefore, t/θ is an upper
bound for the optimal monitoring probability.
Proposition 1 states the main consequences of the application of a monitoring policy
α(·) when the firm reacts optimally to this policy.
Proposition 1 Once the EA has announced the monitoring policy α(·), if the firm
chooses a report z(e) that minimizes its costs when the emission level is e, then:
α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e, (1)
and




Moreover, if (1) and (2) hold, then z(e) minimizes firm’s expected costs over the
set of all possible equilibrium reports, i.e., {z|z = z(eo) for some eo ∈ [e, e]} when
the emission level is e.
We now explain the main insights of Proposition 1, which is a classic result in con-
tinuous-type adverse selection models. For any given report, the penalty that the firm
pays if it is caught underreporting increases with its realized pollution level. Therefore,
the higher the emission level, the more incentives the firm has to chose reports with
low monitoring probability. That is, incentive compatibility constraints explain that
α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e. As to the expected costs, Equation (2) states that the cost
borne by the firm when its emissions are e is the integral of the monitoring probability
of every level below e. This equation is also explained by the firm’s possibility of
underreporting. By inspecting with probability α(z(x)), the EA makes the firm pay an
expected penalty of θα(z(x)) when its emission level is x . But this similarly affects
the firm’s expected costs when it emissions are higher than x , since z(x) is always a
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possible report for this firm. Hence, Equation (2) provides the expected cost borne by
the firm when its emission level is e.
Note that, although the tax rate t does not explicitly appear in Equation (2), it plays
a role as it sets the upper bound for the probability α(·). The rate t is only important
for those emission levels for which the firm reports honestly. For example, if the report
z(e) is such that α(z(e)) = t/θ for all e ≤ eˆ and α(z(e)) < t/θ otherwise, then we
can write




We can use Proposition 1 to compute firm’s expected costs C(E;α(·)) of using the
technology E :
Proposition 2 Given the monitoring policy α(·), if the report strategy z(·) minimizes
firm’s costs for all emission levels, then:
C(E;α(·)) = c(e;α(·)) + θ
e∫
e
α(z(e)) [1 − F(e; E)] de. (3)
In this section, we have developed the analysis for an exogenous monitoring policy.
In the next sections, we characterize the optimal monitoring policy from the EA’s point
of view.
3 Two production technologies
We analyze a situation where two production technologies are possible: E D and EC .
Technology EC is a cleaner but also more expensive technology than E D (subscript C
stands for “clean” and D for “dirty” ).2 We assume that the firm is initially producing
according to E D and we denote by  the cost of switching from the dirty technology
to the clean one. We can also see our model as a situation where the firm is not using
any of the two technologies and, assuming that both of them give positive profits
(anticipating the monitoring activities of the EA), it has to chose one of them. In this
case,  is interpreted as the difference in costs of the technologies, i.e., the cost to
adopt the former instead of the later. 3
Given the policy announced by the Government and the EA involving taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties over unreported emissions, the firm will
2 We will discuss about sufficient conditions for EC to be preferable from a social point of view in the
welfare analysis developed in Sect. 5, which will also apply to Sect. 6.
3 In our framework, the emissions from both technologies are equally difficult to inspect. Some authors
have analyzed technologies that can affect the observability of firms’ emissions. Heyes (1993) considers
a model where firms may invest in decreasing “inspectability”. Millock et al. (2002) studies a choice of
technology that affects the verifiability of emission: adopting the technology allows nonpoint sources to
become point sources.
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choose the clean technology if and only if its total expected costs are lower than using
the dirty technology, that is, if C(EC ;α(·)) +  ≤ C(E D;α(·)). This inequality can






F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de. (4)
It might be the case that the firm chooses technology E D for any possible moni-
toring strategy. Indeed, if the difference in cost  is very large, the firm may prefer
paying all the expected taxes corresponding to the emissions induced by E D rather
than adopting the clean technology. In what follows, we will assume that the set of
functions α(·) that lead the firm to choose EC is not empty, which is equivalent to state
that the toughest policy leads the firm to use the clean technology, that is Equation 4
holds (with strict inequality) for α(z) = t/θ for all z.4




F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de.
Although part of the analysis of the optimal policy can be developed without any
additional assumption concerning the distribution functions F(e; EC ) and F(e; E D),
the complete characterization of the policies requires further assumptions. In particu-
lar, we will assume that the density functions f (e; EC ) and f (e; E D) are linear. Also,
to help notation, we will normalize [e, e] = [0, 1].
Assumption 2 f (e; EC ) = a + 2 [1 − a] e, f (e; E D) = b + 2 [1 − b] e, for all
e ∈ [0, 1] , where a, b ∈ (0, 2) , and a > b.
Note that the property F(1; EC ) = F(1; E D) = 1 characterizes the slope of the
linear functions f (1; EC ) and f (1; E D), once we choose the independent terms a
and b. Moreover, the idea that EC is a cleaner technology than E D is reflected in the
inequality a > b. Also note that although Assumption 2 is restrictive, it allows the
flexibility of dealing with distribution functions F(e; EC ) and F(e; E D) that may be
linear (a = 1 or b = 1) concave (a > 1 or b > 1), or convex (a < 1 or b < 1). On
the other hand, it is a strong assumption that is helpful to identify a simple monitoring
policy. After Proposition 3, we state reasonable hypotheses that allow reaching similar
conclusions to those obtained under Assumption 2, at least when the cost of adopting
the clean technology is low.
The monitoring policy decided by the EA strongly influences the choice between
EC and E D . In the remaining of the paper, we look for the optimal monitoring policy
in three scenarios.
4 Assumption 1 can also be written as
∫ e
e te f (e; EC )de +  <
∫ e
e te f (e; E D)de, which means that the
clean technology is cheaper than the dirty one if the firm always complies with environmental taxes.
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4 A reference framework: optimal monitoring when the cost  is public
information
In this section, we characterize the optimal monitoring policy if the EA wants a firm to
adopt technology EC . We consider a situation where the EA knows the cost , but is
uninformed about the technology that the firm adopts and about the realized emission
level. This informational set-up is not realistic in most scenarios since the precise cost
for a firm to adopt a technology is better known by the firm. However, it is extremely
useful as a reference since the analysis will help us to understand the effects at work
and to better present the results in the other two cases, where  is assumed to be firm’s
private information (studied in Sects. 5, 6). The optimization problem of the EA, that
minimizes monitoring costs, is program [P] below. The first three constraints take into
account that the firm will chose its report strategically, while the last constraint states





α(z(e))d F(e; EC )
s.t.: α(z(e)) is nonincreasing in e
α(z(e)) ∈ [0, t/θ ] for all e ∈ [e, e]






F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de.
Let us remark that program [P] is different from (and more complex than) the pro-
grams that describe adverse selection problems analyzed in the previous literature, as
Sánchez and Sobel (1993).5 Program [P] includes the incentive constraint (4), which
was not present in previous contributions, and which adds a new dimension of asym-
metric information (a moral hazard problem) to the existing adverse selection problem.
It leads to some additional difficulties in the search for the optimal monitoring policy.
We show in the Appendix that the optimal monitoring policy is always very simple:
for any distribution function F(.), there exists a solution α(·) to [P] that takes on at
most one value different from 0 and t/θ .
Under Assumption 2, the optimal policy is even simpler as it only takes two values.
To state this Proposition, let us define the function h(e) as follows:
h(e) ≡ f (e; EC ) − F(e; E
C ) − F(e; E D)∫ e
e
[
F(x; EC ) − F(x; E D)] dx F(e; E
C ).
Under Assumption 2, h(e) is first negative and then positive. We denote by e∗ the
cut-off level such that h(e) < 0 if e < e∗ and h(e) > 0 if e > e∗, that is, e∗ is
defined by h(e∗) = 0. Note that the cut-off level e∗ only depends on the shape of the
5 However, the techniques developed in Sánchez and Sobel (1991) will help us solve [P].
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distribution functions, and in particular is independent of the cost . We also define





F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de = ,
z∗ = e + 
t
(
e∗ − e)∫ e∗
e
[





F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de = .
Proposition 3 characterizes the optimal monitoring policy as a function of the report,
α(z), as well as firm’s reporting behavior given the optimal monitoring policy, z(e).
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We distinguish two regions:
(a) If  < t
∫ e∗
e [F(e; EC )−F(e; E D)]de, then the following policy α∗(z) is optimal:
α∗(z) = γ̂ for all z ∈ [e, z∗) ,
α∗(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [z∗, e] .
Facing the monitoring policy α∗(z), the firm’s reporting strategy is the following:
z(e) = e for all e ∈ [e, e∗) ,
z(e) = z∗ for all e ∈ [e∗, e] .
(b) If  ≥ t ∫ e∗e [F(e; EC )−F(e; E D)]de, then the following policy α∗(z) is optimal:
α∗(z) = t/θ for all z ∈ [e, ê) ,
α∗(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [̂e, e] .
Facing the monitoring policy α∗(z), the firm’s reporting strategy is the following:
z(e) = e for all e ∈ [e, ê) ,
z(e) = ê for all e ∈ [̂e, e] .
The optimal monitoring policy is very simple. We highlight its main characteristics.
First, for any cost , the EA will always monitor, at least, the reports correspond-
ing to all the emission levels lower than the cut-off value e∗. Note that the cut-off
e∗ is usually high; under Assumption 2 and for the intermediate case a = 1, we
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Fig. 1 Monitoring and
reporting behavior when
switching costs are low
Reports never monitored: 
α(z) = 0 
z(e) = z*
(tax evasion) 
Reports monitored with prob: 






Fig. 2 Monitoring and
reporting behavior when
switching costs are high Reports never monitored: 





α(z) = t / θ
z(e) = e
(honest tax report) 
ê
have e∗ = 3/4.6 Second, the probability of monitoring is the same for all the reports
subject to audit. Third, as long as the incentive problem is not very acute, in the
sense that adopting the clean technology is not very costly, the EA will only monitor
when the realized emission level is lower than e∗ (for that purpose, it will only mon-
itor when the reported emission level is lower that z∗). The probability of audit γ̂ is
increasing with  until it reaches the maximum value t/θ . This defines the border-
line between cases (a) and (b). From then on, the EA audits additional reports. That
is why, when the incentive problem is very severe, the monitoring probability is the
highest possible, among the sensible ones, (i.e., α = t/θ ) for all the reports subject to
audit.
Given the optimal monitoring policy, there is always under-reporting when the
switching cost is not too high (Region (a)). Indeed, the firm makes the lowest report e
if its emissions are under e∗; otherwise, it pays the taxes corresponding to the report z∗
to make sure that it will not be monitored. In Region (b), there is truthful reporting for
lower emission levels and under-reporting for higher levels. The optimal monitoring
policy and firm’s reporting behavior are depicted in Figs. 1 and 2.
In Fig. 1 (the interpretation of Fig. 2 is similar) the left-hand side represents the
EA’s optimal policy as a function of the firm’s report (which is measured in the vertical
axe), while the right-hand side represents the firm’s reporting behavior as a function
of the realized emission (also measured in the vertical axe). We can see in this figure
6 It can be shown that e∗ = −2a+
√
4a2+6a(1−a)
2(1−a) ∈ (0, 1) when a = 1, and that e∗ is an increasing
function of a.
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that the cut-off level of emissions e∗ from which on the firm starts reporting positive
emissions is strictly higher than the report z∗ that provides immunity.
We now explain the intuitions behind Proposition 3. The EA’s objective is to
dissuade the firm from using the dirty technology at the lowest (monitoring) cost.
To “ convince” the firm, the EA must choose a monitoring strategy that makes the
firm bear high expected environmental costs (also taking into account the penalties)
if it uses the dirty technology, and low expected costs if it produces according to the
clean one.
A dirty technology produces high emission levels more often than a clean technol-
ogy. For the case of linear density functions over the interval [0, 1] (Assumption 2), the
dirty technology has higher density for e ∈ (1/2, 1] and lower density for e ∈ [0, 1/2).
Therefore, in terms of dissuasion, the EA would find it beneficial to make the firm pay
as much as possible when realized emissions are high and as little as possible when
realized emissions are low. However, the EA does not observe the realized emission
level, it only receives the firm’s report.
According to Equation (2) in Proposition 1, the cost borne by the firm when the
emission level is eo is the integral of the monitoring probability of every level below
eo. That is, increasing the probability of monitoring the report corresponding to a
level e affects in the same way the cost suffered for every emission level higher than
e. Hence, monitoring the report corresponding to a high emission level, say e′ > 1/2,
provides incentives to adopt the clean technology, as it affects the cost borne for every
realized emission e ≥ e′. On the other hand, monitoring the report corresponding to a
low emission level, say e′′ < 1/2, provides mixed incentives since it affects the cost
associated to both high (every e > 1/2) and low (every e ∈ [e′, 1/2)) emission levels.
The difficulty is that, from Equation (1) in Proposition 1, the EA is constrained
to use a monitoring probability nonincreasing in the emission level. That is, if the
EA wants to monitor the (firm’s optimal) report corresponding to a certain level of
emissions eo, then it is forced to monitor the reports corresponding to all the levels
e < eo with, at least, the same frequency.
To understand how the EA solves the previous trade-off, consider that  is small so
that inducing the firm to switch to the clean technology is easy (Region (a) in Propo-
sition 3). Could it make sense for the EA to monitor only the reports corresponding to
low emission levels? The answer is no. The EA does better monitoring reports chosen
by a larger range of emission levels (including levels higher than 1/2) with lower
probability. The cost paid in case of high emission level will be the same, while the
cost borne in case of lower emission levels will be lower, which gives the firm more
incentives to adopt the clean technology. Is it optimal for the EA to set a full flat policy
(i.e., e∗ = e)? The answer to this question is also negative because monitoring the
report corresponding to emission levels very close to e only affects the payment of a
very small interval of emissions.
In the case where the density function f (e; EC ) is uniform, i.e., a = 1, the trade-
off leads to a flat policy where all the reports corresponding to e < 3/4 = e∗ are
monitored with the same probability. When f (e; EC ) is not uniform, the argument is
more complex, as switching monitoring probabilities from one level to the other has
consequences in terms of monitoring costs. This is why when the density function
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f (e; EC ) is decreasing, it is optimal to state an even flatter technology (e∗ > 3/4),
while the opposite happens when f (e; EC ) is increasing.7
We now discuss on the generality of the results with respect to the shape of the
distribution functions, that is, when Assumption 2 is dropped and general distribution
functions are considered. First, as already said, the solution always takes on at most
one value different from 0 and t/θ . Second, monitoring every single emission with
some probability is never optimal. Third, the property that the monitoring policy is flat
for quite a wide range of emissions can be stated under reasonable hypotheses. For
example, assume that F(e; EC ) > F(e; E D) for all e ∈ (e, e), F(e; EC )− F(e; E D)
is first increasing and then decreasing in e, and F(e; EC ) is concave in e. Under this
sufficient condition, we can prove that there exists a cut-off value z# (that lies in the
region of emissions where F(e; EC )− F(e; E D) is decreasing) such that α(z) is con-
stant for all z < z#. In particular, only the reports z < z# are monitored (with a low
probability) when the cost of adopting the clean technology is low. On the other hand,
it seems more difficult to propose general sufficient conditions to establish the precise
form of the optimal monitoring strategy for intermediate reports, which is relevant
when the cost of adopting the clean technology is high.
Next, Corollary 1 states the monitoring cost ECost () of the implementation of
the clean technology as a function of the parameters of the model.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
(I) Expected monitoring costs ECost are the following:
(Ia) If  < t
∫ e∗
e [F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)]de, then:
ECost () = 
θ
F(e∗; EC )∫ e∗
e
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de .
(Ib) If  ≥ t ∫ e∗e [F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)]de, then:







(II) Expected monitoring costs are increasing in the difference  and they are
decreasing with the penalty rate θ; they are higher the less clean is technology
7 It is worth comparing our context with situations in which the objective of the agency is to raise the
largest amount of taxes, for a given technology. In these situations, the agency is much less interested in
focusing on high-emission levels. For example, in the tax evasion literature it is assumed that the distribu-
tion of income is given (i.e., there is no “choice of technology to earn income”) and the objective of the
enforcement agency is to maximize the collected revenues (taxes plus penalties). In this case, the optimal
policy consists in auditing all the taxpayers reporting incomes lower than a certain cut-off income with a
probability high enough so that those reports will happen to be truthful, while the taxpayers earning higher
incomes will report the cut-off income and will not be subject to audit. The main intuition for this result is
similar to the one we have provided in the main text: putting pressure over the report corresponding to an
emission level increases the revenue collected from every higher level. That is, it is beneficial to concentrate
the monitoring in the lowest levels of income (with the maximum probability t/θ ).
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EC and the less dirty is technology E D. Finally, expected costs are increasing in
the ratio t/θ in Region (b).
First, the higher the cost  for the firm to switch to the clean technology, the higher
the monitoring cost required to give it incentives to adopt EC . Second, a higher penalty
rate θ makes it easier to “convince” the firm, hence it decreases the EA’s cost. Third, the
larger (in terms of expected emissions) the difference between the two technologies,
the more the EA’s monitoring can target the dirty technology, which also decreases
monitoring costs. Finally, if the tax rate t increases, the EA must increase the moni-
toring probability if it wants the firm to be honest when the level of pollution is low
(which is the optimal policy in Region (b)). Therefore, the monitoring costs increase
with t . That is, a tough policy in terms of penalty rate and (in Region (b)) a soft policy
in terms of tax rate help in keeping low monitoring costs.8
5 Optimal policy when both the technology adopted and the cost 
are not observable by the EA
We address the EA’s optimal policy when both the cost  of adopting the clean tech-
nology and the technology used by a firm are firms’ private information. We model this
situation as follows. The EA faces a set of firms characterized by the cost parameter
. Each firm knows its parameter . The EA does not know the particular cost  of a
firm, but it knows that  is distributed in the family of firms according to the density
function g() over the interval [0,]; we denote by G() the distribution function
of .9
The environment considered in this section corresponds to situations where the
precise “technology” used by the firm is difficult to verify. Firms decide whether
to implement rigorous protocols or organizational modes that help decreasing the
expected emissions. They also choose whether to employ good (and expensive) human
resources and whether to adopt the best practices and know how to improve the func-
tioning of existing equipment in order to reduce risks. In other words, “clean” or “dirty”
refer to the decisions that firms take with respect to the maintenance and improvement
of the environmental performance of existing technology or to avoiding mistakes.
A firm uses a clean technology when it devotes (monetary and human) resources to
the good functioning of its equipment, while a firm produces according to a dirty
technology when it does not put in place the means to ensure the correct running of
the equipment, thus leading to higher expected level of emissions.
The EA cares about expected environmental damage, hence its concern is whether
the firms choose the clean or the dirty technology. It weights the benefits of the expected
reduction of the damage against the monitoring costs and the firms’ cost to implement
the clean technology. The EA’s policy is anonymous, i.e., every type of firm is subject
8 Note that if the penalty rate is proportional to the tax rate, say θ = (1+π)t , then an increase in t decreases
expected costs in region (a) and an increase in π decreases expected costs in both regions.
9 The analysis developed in this and next section can also be interpreted as the study of the optimal monitor-
ing policy when the EA monitors only one firm whose parameter  is unknown and distributed according to
the function G(). Propositions and corollaries have an immediate interpretation in this alternative context.
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to the same monitoring policy. Inspection of the incentive compatibility constraint (4)
makes it clear that incentives to switch to the clean technology are strictly decreasing
with the switching cost. That is, for a given monitoring policy, if a firm with parameter
 adopts EC , a firm with parameter ′ <  will also adopt it. Therefore, any policy
α(.) will induce a firm to adopt EC if its parameter lies in an interval [0,n], for some
n ∈ [0,].10
Next proposition characterizes the policy that minimizes monitoring costs when
the EA wants all firms with  in the interval [0,n] to switch to EC . The policy
is qualitative the same as the one stated in Proposition 3, although the cut-off levels
are different. The precise value for the parameters en, zn, ê n, and γ̂ n that appear
in Proposition 4 are given in the Appendix. They do not correspond to the optimal
cut-off levels whenever the EA would like to give incentives to switch technology
to a firm with parameter n . That is, the homogeneous monitoring policy does not
coincide with the optimal policy for the “marginal firm” n . It is the optimal policy
for a “fictitious” firm with the following characteristics: it has adoption costs of n ;
its incentives to switch are given by the difference between the distribution functions
F(e; EC ) and F(e; E D); however, its actual emissions are given by the (average)
distribution function G(n)F(e; EC ) + [1 − G(n)]F(e; E D).
Proposition 4 Suppose the firms’ cost parameter  is distributed according to G(),
it is firm’s private information, the EA cannot observe the technology choice, and
Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then, when the EA wants firms with  ∈ [0,n] to adopt
EC :
(a) If n < t
∫ en
e [F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)]de, then the following policy αn(z) is
optimal:
αn(z) = γ̂ n for all z ∈ [e, zn) ,
αn(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [zn, e] .
(b) If n ≥ t ∫ ene [F(e; EC )− F(e; E D)]de, then the following policy αn(z) is opti-
mal:
αn(z) = t/θ for all z ∈ [e, ê n) ,
αn(z) = 0 for all z ∈ [ê n, e] .
The policy αn(z) stated in Proposition 4 requires monitoring all reports below a
cut-off value (en or ên depending on the region) with the same probability, that is,
a large range of (low) reports are monitored with a uniform probability, while high
reports are never monitored. The discussion after Proposition 3 provides the main
intuitions behind the optimality of the policy proposed in Proposition 4.
Once we have identified the optimal monitoring policy if the EA wants that firms
with  ∈ [0,n] adopt EC , we discuss the choice of n , that is, the decision concern-
ing the set of firms that will be induced to switch to the clean technology. The optimal
10 The letter n in n stands for (technology adoption) non verifiable. In next section, the adoption is
supposed verifiable and we will use v .
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policy minimizes the expected total costs: environmental damage plus monitoring and
abatement costs. We elaborate on the three parts of the EA’s expected costs.
Abatement costs are easy to treat. They are incurred by the firms, they are increasing




The expected monitoring costs ECostn([0,n]) of the policy αn(z) when the adop-
tion of the technology is not observable also depend on the interval [0,n]. Using










G(n) f (e2; EC ) +
[
1 − G(n)] f (e2; E D)][




where e2 = en and γ = γ̂ n in Region (a) and e2 = ê n and γ = t/θ in Region
(b). An increase in the cut-off level n has two effects on the monitoring costs. First,
to induce firms with a higher switching cost to adopt EC , a higher monitoring prob-
ability is necessary. This affects a firm independently on its type and is reflected in
the second term in the right-hand side of (5). Second, there are types of firms that
were keeping E D before the increase in the cut-off and are adopting EC after the
change. Firms using EC are monitored more often (although their expected payment
is lower) than if they keep E D (this is due to the property that the monitoring proba-
bility should be non-decreasing in realized emission, see Proposition 1). Both effects
go in the same direction: inducing more firms to adopt EC increases the monitoring
costs.
Finally, expected environmental damage is a function of the expected emission
level of the technology and it may also depend on its variance as the damage is often
considered a convex function of the emission level. In our model, the critical deci-
sion in terms of environmental damage is which technology is adopted by the firms.
Hence, we denote D(G(n)) the expected damage due to emissions when there are
G(n) firms producing with the clean technology and 1−G(n) firms using E D . The
function D(G(n)) is assumed strictly decreasing in G(n), i.e., in n . In environ-
ments with many firms producing with a similar technology and whose level of actual
emission is not correlated, D(G(n)) is decreasing if EC induces a lower expected
emission level than E D , i.e.,
∫ e
e ed F(e; EC ) <
∫ e
e ed F(e; E D). If the number of firms
is small or, more importantly, there is strong correlation between firms’ actual emis-
sions, we need further assumptions that make sure that a potential higher volatility of
EC does not translate into higher expected damage. A sufficient assumption to ensure
11 The optimal solution of program [P M ] always involves e1 = e.
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that D(G(n)) is decreasing is:12
∫ e
eo ed F(e; EC ) <
∫ e
eo ed F(e; E D) for all eo < e
(although weaker assumptions can also be sufficient).
Therefore, the optimal policy minimizes:




We compare the chosen level n with the first-best, denoted ∗, which is the opti-
mal level if a firm’s cost  was public information and the firm’s technology verifiable.
In the first-best, the Government (or the EA) would weight benefits of adopting tech-
nology EC due to the reduction in the damage against costs of adoption, . Given
that ECostn([0,n]) is increasing in n , it is immediate that the optimal decision
will push too few firms to acquire the clean technology compared with the first-best
situation, that is, n < ∗. Hence, the expected level of damage will be higher than
the first-best level of damage:
Corollary 2 Suppose the cost parameter  and the technology adopted are the firms’
private information. Then, the optimal monitoring policy induces firms to adopt tech-
nology EC for an interval of parameters [0,n∗] that is smaller than the first-best
interval [0,∗].
6 Optimal monitoring when the technology adopted by the firms is verifiable
but the cost  is not
In this section, we study the environments where the EA can easily verify the tech-
nology adopted by each firm. However, it does not know the adoption costs . The
framework considered in this section is a plausible one when the technologies repre-
sent different types of physical capital. It may then be easy to check whether a firm has
indeed adopted a given emissions-reducing technology, but it is not easy for the EA to
assess each firm’s cost of the adoption. We can have in mind a set of firms or industries
that rely on internal combustion engines for production. Some of these industries may
be transportation, some manufacturing, some gas, diesel, coal. All emit carbon. All
can purchase an abatement technology, but the cost of the technology is unknown by
the EA and can differ across industries.
Given that the EA is not concerned about the environmental taxes raised, the opti-
mal policy in this case involves not monitoring at all a firm that decides to switch
to EC . Therefore, a firm can “buy” immunity from environmental taxes by adopting
the clean technology. This is the first characteristic of the optimal policy. Second, for
similar reasons as in the previous section, for any given monitoring policy (that will
only be applied to the firm if it keeps E D) the firm adopts EC if its parameter  lies
in an interval [0,v].
12 The density functions satisfying Assumption 2 have this property.
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What is the optimal monitoring policy for the firm when it adopts E D? It needs
to give incentives for the firm to switch to EC even when its costs are v and the
distribution of emissions of those firms that are monitored is F(e; E D). Therefore:
Proposition 5 Suppose the firms’ cost parameter  is distributed according to G(),
it is firms’ private information, the EA can observe the technology choice, and Assump-
tions 1 and 2 hold. Then, the optimal policy when the EA wants that firms with  ∈
[0,v] adopt EC is:
(i) A firm that adopts EC is not monitored.
(ii) A firm that adopts E D is audited according to the policy found in Proposition 3
for a firm with adoption costs equal to v .
From Proposition 5, we see that the monitoring policy will only be applied to firms
that use E D , which happens when their parameter lie in the interval (v,]. More-
over, the policy applied is the one that would be optimal if the EA would face a firm
with “known” adoption cost of v . As we already described in Sect. 4, the optimal
monitoring policy is a simple cut-off policy: reports lower than a certain threshold are
inspected with a constant probability while any firm can avoid inspection by reporting
that threshold emission level.




]) = [1 − G(v)]
e∗∫
e
γ̂ f (e; E D)de





F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de ,





]) = [1 − G(v)] t F (̂e; E D)
θ
.









F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de .
As it was the case in the previous section, an increase in v has two effects on the
monitoring costs. On the one hand, for firms with a higher switching cost to adopt EC ,
the monitoring probability must increase to “convince” those firms to adopt the clean
technology. On the other hand, the population of firms that are monitored is smaller,
as more firms switch to EC . That is, there is an effect (the positive term in the previous
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equation) that makes the monitoring cost increase, while another effect (the negative
term) goes in the sense of decreasing monitoring costs.
Corollary 3 highlights the main implication of the previous discussion: there are
environments where there is too much adoption of clean technology compared with
the first-best situation.
Corollary 3 Suppose the cost parameter  is the firm’s own private information and
that the adoption of the technology is verifiable. Then, the optimal monitoring policy
induces the firm to adopt technology EC for an interval of parameters [0,v∗] that
may be larger or shorter than the first-best interval [0,∗].
Typically, we should expect too much adoption of the clean technology, as com-
pared to the first best situation, precisely in those environments where the first best
requires adoption for a large range of parameters (∗ is high), while the informational
asymmetry should cause too little adoption when ∗ is low. For example, if g()
is uniform, then too many firms switch to the clean technology when ∗ > /2.13
The reason for this result is the following. On the one hand, if the EA decides to
increase adoption from ∗ to ∗ + d, it saves on monitoring costs because a total
of g(∗)d firms switch to EC and they do not need to be monitored any longer. On
the other hand, the increase in the cost due to using a marginally tougher monitoring
depends on the amount of firms that still chose E D , which is equal to (1 − G(∗)).
Therefore, the larger ∗ the more likely it is that it pays the EA to (marginally) induce
more firm in the population to switch to EC .
For example, consider firms’ decision whether to adopt renewable energy processes
(burning biomass) instead of processes based on fossil energy. The adoption of either
process is easy to check, while the actual extra cost due to switching to renewable
energy use may be difficult to assess by the EA. To give the firms incentives to adopt
clean processes, the EA will monitor the pollution of fossil energy plants. Will the
optimal monitoring policy lead to too many or too few renewable plants? On the one
hand, the cost of the monitoring should imply a lower-than-optimal “firms’ effort”,
that is, too little adoption of the clean plants. However, on the other hand, monitoring
is only applied to those firms that still use fossil energy. This gives the EA an extra
motivation to monitor, as tougher monitoring makes the number of monitored firms
decrease. As the previous corollary shows, the optimal policy may imply overswitch-
ing or underswitching to renewable energy processes.
7 Conclusion
We have considered a situation where the environmental policy is based on taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties. We have assumed that the EA faces a
population of firms. Firms’ emissions depend on a decision (adopting the clean or the
dirty technology) and random events. In addition each firm has private information
concerning its realized emission level. We analyze the optimal monitoring strategy
13 In this discussion, we are implicitly assuming that the second-order condition for the EA’s objective
function with respect to  is concave, which happens, for example, if B() is concave enough.
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for the regulator and which firms in the population are induced to adopt the clean
technology.
The added value of our paper lies in the characterization of this monitoring policy
when the firms cannot fully control their emissions, they just decide its distribution.
This random characteristic is not present in previous papers considering optimal audit-
ing and we show that, in contrast with deterministic models, in our framework the
firm’s tax return depends on its emissions and the optimal inspection depends on the
firm’s report. We have developed the analysis in two different scenarios depending on
whether the technology adopted by the firm is verifiable or not. In both cases, the opti-
mal policy is a cut-off policy, where all reports below a threshold are inspected with
the same probability, while reports above the threshold are not monitored. The main
difference between the two scenarios is that, when the EA can check the technology
adopted by the firms, it will only monitor those that keep the dirty technology (the
others will not pay taxes even if bad luck makes them have high emissions), while
all firms need to be subject to monitoring when the technology is not verifiable. It is
intuitive that the EA achieves a higher welfare in the first scenario than in the second.
Therefore, it may have incentives to promote the use of technologies and management
protocols that are easier to verify.
We have also shown that if the adoption of the technology is firms’ private infor-
mation, too few firms will adopt the clean technology under the optimal monitoring
policy. However, when the EA can check the technology adopted by the firms, the
optimal policy may induce overswitching or underswitching to the clean technol-
ogy.
In this paper, we have assumed that the environmental policy is based on taxes over
reported emissions, monitoring, and penalties. We have not considered the possibility
that the Government or the EA might give a firm a subsidy if it switches to the clean
technology, or that it imposes a fixed penalty to firms keeping the dirty technology.
When the technology adopted by the firm is not verifiable (i.e., only the firm knows
the expected level of pollution of the technologies), the previous policies based on
subsidies or penalties cannot be implemented, as they require the EA to be able to
check whether a change to a clean technology has taken place. On the other hand,
when the EA can easily check whether a firm has adopted a more environmentally
friendly technology (or whether it is using the technology trying to minimize emis-
sions), a fixed reward or penalty can be optimal. Therefore, our analysis applies to
those situations where, due to political, technical, or moral hazard constraints, a policy
based on fixed subsidies or penalties is not possible.
Let us note also that we have focused the analysis in those environments where the
main decision concerning emissions is made ex-ante: the firm chooses the production
technology, hires well-trained (or badly-trained) human resources, adopts (or not) the
best practices and know how, or decides whether to implement costly protocols and
organizational modes. We have not allowed the firms the possibility of adjusting their
decisions once production is in place. In those industries where this adjustment is easy
and cheap, a cut-off policy might not provide the right incentives to abate emissions
when bad luck pushes actual emissions to a high level. Including the possibility of
costly adjustment is an interesting and complex extension of our model that is beyond
the scope of the present paper.
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As to further policy implications of our analysis, many experts insist on the impor-
tance of the adoption (and the development) of environmental friendly technologies
in reducing carbon emissions. The deployment of such energy-efficient and low-car-
bon technologies is costly and, in order to induce firms to adopt them, firms need
to receive incentives. In our model, these incentives come from making the use of
the dirty technology costly, via taxes or permits on emissions, but also from the
design of the correct enforcement policy. We provide some insight on the optimal
monitoring strategy depending on whether the adoption of the clean technology is
public or private information when firms do not have perfect control on emissions.
Finally, some analysts signal that among the weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol there
is the fact that the agreement did not provide the countries sufficient incentives for
compliance. To give some advise for international agreements such as the Kyoto
and the Post-Kyoto Protocols one has to take into account that national govern-
ments maintain sovereignty and the design of enforcement policies is in the hands
of national or even regional institutions. To study the incentives and the enforcement
of international agreements in such a hierarchy is an interesting avenue for future
research.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 First, reporting more than the true emissions is never optimal, since
the expected payment is always higher. Second, if e > z and α(z) > t/θ , then t z +
α(z)θ [e − z] > t z + t[e − z], which is the payment the firm would make if it would
report e. Therefore, reporting z is not optimal. Finally, by similar reasons, reporting e
is not optimal when α(z) < t/θ for some z ∈ [e, e). 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 1 Consider two emission levels e1 and e2 with e1 > e2 and the
optimal reports corresponding to these levels, z(e1) and z(e2). Given that the firm
prefers reporting z(e1) than z(e2) when the emission level is e1, and viceversa, we
have:
c(e1;α(·)) = t z(e1) + α(z(e1))θ [e1 − z(e1)] ≤ t z(e2) + α(z(e2))θ [e1 − z(e2)],
c(e2;α(·)) = t z(e2) + α(z(e2))θ [e2 − z(e2)] ≤ t z(e1) + α(z(e1))θ [e2 − z(e1)].
These equations imply:
α(z(e1))θ [e1 − e2] ≤ c(e1;α(·)) − c(e2;α(·)) ≤ α(z(e2))θ [e1 − e2]. (6)
First, since e1 − e2 > 0, (6) requires that α(z(e1)) ≤ α(z(e2)), i.e., α(z(e)) is
nonincreasing in e. Second, α(z(e)) nonincreasing and (6) imply that c(e;α(·)) is
differentiable in e almost everywhere, with dc(e;α(·))de = α(z(e))θ almost everywhere.
Equation (2) immediately follows.
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Finally, assume (1) and (2) hold. Then, a firm with emission level e reporting z(eo)
has an expected cost of:
t z(eo) + α(z(eo))θ [e − z(eo)] = c(eo;α(·)) + α(z(eo))θ [e − eo]
= c(e;α(·)) + θ
eo∫
e
α(z(x))dx + α(z(eo))θ [e − eo]




α(z(x)) − α(z(eo))] dx .
Given (1),
∫ eo
e [α(z(x)) − α(z(eo))]dx ≥ 0.
Therefore, z(e) is optimal in {z|z = z(eo) for some eo ∈ [e, e]}. 
unionsq













⎥⎦ d F(e; E).


































Equation (3) immediately follows. 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 3 We can simplify program [P] as follows. We do not take into
account the constraint that z(e) minimizes c(e, z; EC ;α(·)), and we denote the func-
tion α(z(e)) as β(e). Once we identify β(e), we will use Proposition 1 to decompose
the function β(e) into the optimal monitoring function α(z) and the report function
z(e). The optimal β(·) solves the following program, that we will denote [P ′]:
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β(e)d F(e; EC )
s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e






F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de.
Consider a solution β∗(·) to program [P ′] and B∗ the optimal budget. We claim that







F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de
s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e
β(e) ∈ [0, t/θ ] for all e ∈ [e, e]
e∫
e
β(e)d F(e; EC ) ≤ B∗.
Indeed, if a function β ′(·) would exist involving a higher value for the solution,
β∗(·) would not be the solution to [P ′]: the EA could use β ′′(·) that coincides with






F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de
and β ′′(e) = 0 for all e > eo. This policy would be cheaper than β ′(·), hence it would
cost less than B∗, which is not possible.
We can now use known results (see, for example, Step 4 in the proof of Proposi-
tion 1 in Sánchez and Sobel 1991) to state that there exists a solution to [P ′′] that takes
on at most one value different from 0 and t/θ . That is, there exist γ ∈ (0, t/θ), e1
and e2, with e ≤ e1 ≤ e2 ≤ e, such that the optimal function β(e) has the following
shape: β(e) = t/θ for all e ∈ [e, e1], β(e) = γ for all e ∈ (e1, e2) and β(e) = 0 for






































To find the solution of [P ′′′], we start by proving some claims.
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Claim 1 We can restrict attention to policies where e2 < e.
To prove Claim 1, consider the set of policies characterized by (e1, e2, γ ), with
e1 < e. We do the analysis fixing the level of e1. The parameter γ is given by (7),
that is,
γ = 1∫ e2
e1
[














Therefore, the cost of the policy as a function of e2 is given by the function m(e2):
m(e2) ≡ t
θ
F(e1; EC ) + A F(e2; E
C ) − F(e1; EC )∫ e2
e1
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de ,
where A is a positive constant that does not depend on e2 (it is the second factor
in the expression for γ ). m′(e2 = e) is proportional to f (e2; EC )
∫ e2
e1
[F(e; EC ) −
F(e; E D)]de. Hence, m′(e2 = e) > 0 given Assumption 2. This implies that, at
the optimum, it is always the case that the cost is minimized for a value of e2 lower
than e.
Claim 2 A policy such that e1 = e2 < e∗ is not optimal.
We consider the policies of the form β(e) = γ for all e ∈ [e, e˜) and β(e) = 0 for
all e ∈ [˜e, e], for which (7) holds. In this class of policies, we consider a marginal





F (˜e; EC ) − F (˜e; E D)]∫ e˜
e
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de .
The cost of any policy in this class is γ F (˜e; EC ). Hence, the change in cost due to the
proposed marginal change is F (˜e; EC )∂γ + γ f (˜e; EC )∂ e˜ = h(˜e)γ ∂ e˜. By Assump-
tion 2, h(˜e) < 0 given that e˜ < e∗. Therefore, a marginal increase in e˜ would reduce
the cost. Consequently, a policy with γ = t/θ (i.e., e1 = e2) cannot be optimal since
there is room to increase e˜ and decrease γ in a profitable way, which proves Claim 2.
Claim 3 A policy such that e1 < e2 is not optimal when e1 < e∗.
We follow a similar strategy of proof as in Claim 2. Consider the class of policies of
the form β(e) = γ ′ for all e ∈ [e, e1), β(e) = γ for all e ∈ [e1, e2), and β(e) = 0 for
all e ∈ [e2, e], with γ ′ > γ , for which Equation (7) holds (where we substitute t/θ
by γ ′). We want to show that γ ′ = t/θ cannot be optimal within this class of policies
(hence, it cannot be optimal in general). A marginal change in e1 accompanied by the





γ ′ − γ ) [F(e1; EC ) − F(e1; E D)]∫ e1
e
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de .
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Given that the cost of the policy is γ ′F(e1; EC ) + γ [F(e2; EC ) − F(e1; EC )], the
proposed marginal change in e1 will result in a change in costs of h(e1)(γ ′ − γ )∂e1.
By the same reasons as in Claim 2, a marginal increase in e1 would decrease the
costs whenever e1 < e∗ and γ ′ > γ. In particular, the policy where γ ′ = t/θ cannot
be optimal, since there is room to decrease γ ′ and increase e1, which lowers the cost
of the monitoring.
Claim 4 A policy such that e1 = e2 > e∗ and γ < t/θ is not optimal.
The proof is similar to the proof of Claim 2. The difference is that now h(˜e) is
positive since e˜ > e∗ Therefore, decreasing e˜ and increasing γ (when this change is
possible, i.e., when γ < t/θ ) decreases the costs of the policy.
Claim 5 A policy such that e1 < e2 is not optimal when e1 ≥ e∗.
To prove this Claim, we consider Program [P ′′]. By contradiction, suppose that the
optimal e1 is an interior solution (we already now that e2 < e). Denoting λ ≥ 0 the
Lagrange multiplier of (7) in [P ′′], the first order conditions of the Lagrange function




























F(e2; EC ) − F(e2; E D)
]]
= 0. (9)










F(e2; EC ) − F(e2; E D) . (10)
Under Assumption 2, Equation (10) is written as:
a + 2 [1 − a] e1
[a − b] [e1 − e21
] = a + 2 [1 − a] e2
[a − b] [e2 − e22
] ,
i.e., [a + 2[1 − a]e1]e22 − [a + 2[1 − a]e21]e2 + a[e1 − e21] = 0. Easy calculations
show that, when e1 ≥ e∗ the previous equality does not have any solution (in e2) in
the interval (e1, 1].
We now complete the characterization of the solution of [P ′′′]. Claims 3 and 5 allow
to state that the optimal policy has only two regions. Hence, it has the following form:
β(e) = γ̂ for all e ∈ [e, ê) and β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [̂e, e], where, given Claims 1 and
2, ê ∈ [e∗, e). Finally, Claim 4 leaves as the unique candidate the following policy:
(a) If  < t
∫ e∗
e [F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)]de, then β(e) = γ̂ for all e ∈ [e, e∗) and
β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [e∗, e], where γ̂ < t/θ is defined as in the Proposition.
(b) If  ≥ t ∫ e∗e [F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)]de, then β(e) = t/θ for all e ∈ [e, ê) and
β(e) = 0 for all e ∈ [̂e, e], where ê ≥ e∗ is defined as in the Proposition.
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Finally, we transform the function β(e) into α(z) and z(e).
(a) We first prove that, given the function α∗(z) introduced in the proposition, z(e)
is the optimal firms’ strategy. It is easy to check that γ̂ < t/θ implies that firms
either will report z = e or z = z∗, any other possible report is dominated. The
expected costs of a firm with emission level e are lower reporting e than z∗ if:
te + γ̂ θ [e − e] < t z∗ = te + 
(
e∗ − e)∫ e∗
e
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de ,
i.e., given the characterization of γ̂ ,

[
e − e]∫ e∗
e
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de <

(
e∗ − e)∫ e∗
e
[
F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de ,
or e < e∗.
Since z(e) is optimal for the firms given α∗(z), the policy α∗(z) achieves the policy
β(e) we found before, hence, it is optimal under Assumptions 1 and 2.
(b) In this case, it is immediate to check that firms’ strategy is optimal given α∗(z)
and that the policy α∗(z) is then optimal. 
unionsq
Proof of Corollary 1 The proof follows easily from Proposition 3. 
unionsq




s.t.: β(e) is nonincreasing in e




β(e)d F(e; EC ) + [1 − G(n)]
e∫
e






F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de.
Following the same steps as in Proposition 3, there exists a solution to the previous
program that takes on at most one value γ different from 0 and t/θ . Also, the policy
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where we have denoted F(e; E M ) ≡ G(n)F(e; EC ) + [1 − G(n)]F(e; E D). We
note that the distribution function F(e; E M ) is the cumulative distribution function of
a linear density function f (e; E M ) = an + 2[1 − an]e, where an = G(n)a + [1 −
G(n)]b. We denote
hn(e) ≡ f (e; E M ) − F(e; E
C ) − F(e; E D)∫ e
e
[
F(x; EC ) − F(x; E D)] dx F(e; E
M ).
Under Assumption 2, hn(e) is first negative and then positive. We denote by en the
cut-off level such that hn(en) = 0. It is easily checked that en < e∗.
From now on, we can follow the same steps as in Claims 1 to 5 in the proof of
Proposition 3, where we have to consider n instead of , en instead of e∗, and hn()
instead of h(). The claims lead to the following unique candidate policy:




F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)] de, then:
βn(e) = γ̂ n for all e ∈ [e, en) ,





F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de = n .
(b) If n ≥ t ∫ ene [F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)]de, then:
βn(e) = t/θ for all e ∈ [e, ên) ,





F(e; EC ) − F(e; E D)
]
de = n .
Given the previous function βn(e), we follow the same steps as in the proof of
Proposition 3 to show that the function αn(z) corresponds to βn(e). The cut-off
value zn that appears in the Proposition corresponds to the report made by a firm
whose realized emission is en and is indifferent between reporting 0 (and being
monitored with probability γ̂ n) and reporting zn and avoiding monitoring. That
is, zn is characterized by te + γ̂ nθ [en − e] = t zn . 
unionsq
Proof of Proposition 5 It follows from Proposition 3. 
unionsq
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